'The Four Worst Mistakes Of The Axis Powers During WWII': A Response

This blog is in response to the 'War History Online' article The Four Worst Mistakes Of The Axis Powers During WWII.

1. The Nazis did not ally themselves with Italy; although Italy had signed a prewar military alliance with Germany, the latter did not enter the war with a partner in mind. Italy only declared war 9 June 1940, 10 months after the commencement of hostilities; during the evacuation from Dunkirk, when it seemed likely the war would soon be over. A suspicious mind might suggest they only did so to share in the spoils.

2. They were not ideologically similar, albeit Mussolini did want an Italian empire, hence his invasion of British held territories in North Africa when he thought they were beaten. There is evidence that Italians openly defied German laws regarding Jews for instance, so there was no racial element to their goals.

0 for 2 in the first sentence.

The ill-fated Italian invasion of Greece was indeed a bad move for Germany. Its failure put the Ploesti oilfields in Romania within range of RAF bombers, the British having honoured their commitment to aid Greece if invaded. With Barbarossa so close Germany could not afford to have a major source of fuel disrupted – they would be operating thousands of miles from home at the end of very long supply lines. It was therefore not merely helping an ally – in fact that probably figured very little in the justification – but securing their fuel supplies for the impending invasion which was the German reason for counter-attacking in the Balkans. Hitler had previously advised Mussolini he required his forces in place by the beginning of May; they were only returned to launch Barbarossa on 22 June.

The advance of Barbarossa faltering due to bad weather just short of Moscow ultimately sealed the fate of the Russia invasion, albeit the nadir of German fortunes occurred at Stalingrad, and later Kursk. With this proving the turning point all the way back to Berlin in 1945 it must be wondered what that seven week delay ultimately cost Germany. It may be argued that it was not the German decision to launch Barbarossa that was in error, but to do so following a significant delay caused by Italy.

The rout of the Italian forces in North Africa similarly put Germany at risk – had the British advanced all the way through and also taken German territories in North Africa. Therefore Rommel and the - later famed - Afrika Korps were despatched to resolve the issue. However Rommel was again at the end of very long supply lines – across the Mediterranean before supplies even started to be moved to the troop locations. Yet another reason they could not afford to allow the Balkans to remain in British / Greek hands. Magnifying this was an abject failure by Italy to assist the ally who had come to their aid, not once but twice. Italian shipping had a capacity of just under two million tonnes in 1942, yet delivered less than 200,000 tonnes in the July / August period to Libyan ports with a capacity of 120,000 tonnes per month.

The above illustrates that an argument can be made for Italian misadventures being responsible, at least in part, for failure in North Africa and in Eastern Europe. In both cases Italian failure to support German forces, or cause them to be unavailable when required, had serious consequences for success in both theatres. Therefore, Italian misadventures caused problems – arguably lost the war if you take the Barbarossa argument to its logical conclusion – for Germany.

However there was even more. Just by entering the war Italy caused Germany problems before they even did anything.

The rules of war proscribed all combatants from overflying neutral territory. Had Italy remained neutral Germany’s southern border would have remained secure and the Allies could not even have flown over it. Subsequent to the invasion of Italy in 1943, Allied bombers were able to target southern Germany, and again the Romanian oil fields. Also Germany were of course obliged to garrison Italy not to defend the country itself, but their own southern border. That drew troops away from other theatres where they were required.

The role of Italy then was far more complex and deleterious to both sides than the article suggests, and although Nazi Germany did not declare war jointly with Italy perhaps the error lies with the earlier signed military alliance.

Finally, brief mention of the lack of an alliance between the Nazis, Spain and Turkey. Whilst this is technically true, it is also known that the Abwehr (German intelligence) operated relatively openly in Spain despite the officially neutral status of the country. Operation Mincemeat (the Allied deception of the Axis prior to invading Sardinia) was founded on the knowledge that secret documents found in Spain would end up in German hands.

Portraying History; Popular v Academic

I think there is more than enough room for both popular and academic history in literature and television, and the grey area in between the two.

To explain. In both literature and broadcast documentaries there are sub-genres, of academic history and popular history.

The former as indicated by its name is what is taught in academia - schools, universities etc. - and is written by academics – those who teach its content. It is the active side of history, in that it is populated by those who actively research the original source material, and who debate the relevance and import of their discoveries with others to discern what their findings tell them. Their interest is not merely the facts – although if they contradict previous studies they are of course important. Further than that interest is in the context, how and importantly why events occurred as they did.

Popular history is not as focused on research, in fact is not engaged in research or debate at all. In that sense it is the passive side of history. It takes the content of academic history and repackages it in a form that is more accessible to non-academics. For this reason the why is usually omitted often replaced with a human element such as identifying individuals to engage the reader in the narrative whilst still educating them on the historical topic.

Why is this important? Why indeed am I writing this blog? Simply put, even among consumers of popular history literature there seems to be a resistance to popular history documentaries. Those with greater knowledge bemoan the fact that parts of the whole may have been omitted or abbreviated.

A friend commented the other day that the average reading age in the UK is eight years old. How accurate that is I don’t know, and the specific is not relevant. The point is that more people are liable to watch a TV documentary on a subject than read a book on it. In the context of this blog it takes passive history one step further; not only are viewers consuming the content but – as many documentaries are based on books and presented by the author – they are having the book read to them in language they understand.

As with all television people will gravitate towards programmes presented by people they know. Popular culture personalities [PCPs] such as Dermot O’Leary and Chris Evans (both BBC radio DJs) who presented programmes for the 75^th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain. Jeremy Clarkson (Top Gear) presented a documentary on the Arctic convoy PQ17. The actor Ewan MacGregor and his brother Colin have presented documentaries on military aviation history. Similarly the actor Sir Tony Robinson has presented several history related series’ and documentaries. These are just a few examples.

Unlike author-presenters [APs] such as James Holland, Sir Max Hastings, Ben Macintyre and others, none of the above PCPs are experts on the subject, but that, I think, is their strength. They make the subject accessible to those with an initial passing interest – or possibly no interest who just watched because of the presenter. They provide an entry point into history as they take the viewer along their journey of discovery and education with them. That is not to suggest that APs do not do this too, but in the case of PCPs the viewer is likely to have been drawn in first by their involvement.

I recently saw a trailer for a forthcoming history series where the presenter asked a historian ‘How did Sir Walter Raleigh invent the potato?’ My initial reaction was ‘Err.. what?’ In the context of this blog though it is an important question. Not because of the answer – although I would love to know his response! It is important because she is asking what I can almost guarantee some people have wondered and would like to know. She is taking the viewer with baby steps into the world of history, and every journey starts with those first steps.

All the above provide a pathway to learning. From the simplicity of learning that ‘No Sir Walter Raleigh didn’t invent the potato, he brought it back from a journey of discovery to America’, to Ewan and Colin Macgregor taking the viewer enthusiastically through their exploration of military aviation, to – for example – James Holland presenting a documentary based on his book Dam Busters, and academics such as David Starkey on subjects such as the Tudor dynasty. Every stage increases the viewer’s knowledge of the subject, and it is likely - particularly when based on a book - that the viewer will read the book to delve deeper into the detail which was – inevitably – omitted from the documentary. It is only a small step then to academic history texts.

Opposing any of the steps in learning halts the process of learning, and itself is to be opposed.