'The Four Worst Mistakes Of The Axis Powers During WWII': A Response

This blog is in response to the 'War History Online' article The Four Worst Mistakes Of The Axis Powers During WWII.

1. The Nazis did not ally themselves with Italy; although Italy had signed a prewar military alliance with Germany, the latter did not enter the war with a partner in mind. Italy only declared war 9 June 1940, 10 months after the commencement of hostilities; during the evacuation from Dunkirk, when it seemed likely the war would soon be over. A suspicious mind might suggest they only did so to share in the spoils.

2. They were not ideologically similar, albeit Mussolini did want an Italian empire, hence his invasion of British held territories in North Africa when he thought they were beaten. There is evidence that Italians openly defied German laws regarding Jews for instance, so there was no racial element to their goals.

0 for 2 in the first sentence.

The ill-fated Italian invasion of Greece was indeed a bad move for Germany. Its failure put the Ploesti oilfields in Romania within range of RAF bombers, the British having honoured their commitment to aid Greece if invaded. With Barbarossa so close Germany could not afford to have a major source of fuel disrupted – they would be operating thousands of miles from home at the end of very long supply lines. It was therefore not merely helping an ally – in fact that probably figured very little in the justification – but securing their fuel supplies for the impending invasion which was the German reason for counter-attacking in the Balkans. Hitler had previously advised Mussolini he required his forces in place by the beginning of May; they were only returned to launch Barbarossa on 22 June.

The advance of Barbarossa faltering due to bad weather just short of Moscow ultimately sealed the fate of the Russia invasion, albeit the nadir of German fortunes occurred at Stalingrad, and later Kursk. With this proving the turning point all the way back to Berlin in 1945 it must be wondered what that seven week delay ultimately cost Germany. It may be argued that it was not the German decision to launch Barbarossa that was in error, but to do so following a significant delay caused by Italy.

The rout of the Italian forces in North Africa similarly put Germany at risk – had the British advanced all the way through and also taken German territories in North Africa. Therefore Rommel and the - later famed - Afrika Korps were despatched to resolve the issue. However Rommel was again at the end of very long supply lines – across the Mediterranean before supplies even started to be moved to the troop locations. Yet another reason they could not afford to allow the Balkans to remain in British / Greek hands. Magnifying this was an abject failure by Italy to assist the ally who had come to their aid, not once but twice. Italian shipping had a capacity of just under two million tonnes in 1942, yet delivered less than 200,000 tonnes in the July / August period to Libyan ports with a capacity of 120,000 tonnes per month.

The above illustrates that an argument can be made for Italian misadventures being responsible, at least in part, for failure in North Africa and in Eastern Europe. In both cases Italian failure to support German forces, or cause them to be unavailable when required, had serious consequences for success in both theatres. Therefore, Italian misadventures caused problems – arguably lost the war if you take the Barbarossa argument to its logical conclusion – for Germany.

However there was even more. Just by entering the war Italy caused Germany problems before they even did anything.

The rules of war proscribed all combatants from overflying neutral territory. Had Italy remained neutral Germany’s southern border would have remained secure and the Allies could not even have flown over it. Subsequent to the invasion of Italy in 1943, Allied bombers were able to target southern Germany, and again the Romanian oil fields. Also Germany were of course obliged to garrison Italy not to defend the country itself, but their own southern border. That drew troops away from other theatres where they were required.

The role of Italy then was far more complex and deleterious to both sides than the article suggests, and although Nazi Germany did not declare war jointly with Italy perhaps the error lies with the earlier signed military alliance.

Finally, brief mention of the lack of an alliance between the Nazis, Spain and Turkey. Whilst this is technically true, it is also known that the Abwehr (German intelligence) operated relatively openly in Spain despite the officially neutral status of the country. Operation Mincemeat (the Allied deception of the Axis prior to invading Sardinia) was founded on the knowledge that secret documents found in Spain would end up in German hands.